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Abstract
A distinction in reasons and motives for choosing a particular political leader estab-
lishes the key difference between older and young democracy. The former is based
on electoral history, while the latter is based on feelings and personal attitude. Be-
sides, a comparatively abundant number of political figures (persons or parties and
associations) is specific for young democracies. The problem of a reference votes’
distribution is analyzed. Lefevbre’s theory of a reflexive control is supposed to make
the basis for indifferent choice of political figures. This theory yields a golden section
split of votes (or the series of Fibonacci numbers, for the case of multiple choice).
A typology of political campaigns based on this theory is proposed. A proximity
of ratings of competing persons means the highest electoral tension, a leadership
of a person means a high level of mobilization; a neutral situation corresponds to
Fibonacci numbers distribution of votes.
Key words: indifferent choice, reflexion, golden section, Fibonacci numbers
1 Introduction
Democratic nations exhibit rather stable, apparent and efficient pattern of
public life. This pattern results from a rather long electoral history of the
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nations. Young democracies, which appeared due to a communist system col-
lapse have to run through the same experience in considerably shorter period
of time. Free, direct and independent elections constitute a key issue of any
democratic regime. As a rule, an effective democracy exhibits a considerably
short list of political parties, which take part in the social and political life.
On the contrary, young democracies usually exhibit an extended list of such
entities, in comparison to the elder ones.
Not discussing the origin and current state of political situations in younger
democracies in this paper, lets us instead concentrate on the question con-
cerning the interpretation of the elections results in the situation when an
abundance of political parties taking part in a race exists. A main objective
of any elective system is to establish and legitimatize an authority responsible
for a nation, or for a region within a country. That latter is determined by the
elections results. To get a clear and comprehensive ideas about the legitimate
power, one must understand pretty well what kind of elections results should
be considered as typical, proper and indicative from the public point of view.
Here we propose an approach to determine such “reference” distribution in
the election rankings of candidates or parties. This approach is based on the
theory of reflexive control developed by Vladimir Lefebvre (Lefebvre, 1987a;
Lefebvre, Smolyan, 1975). This approach yields a basis for typifying election
campaigns. Basically, these campaigns could be separated into three classes:
the first class includes the campaigns with high mobilization of voters, the
second class includes the campaigns with high electoral tension, and the last
one includes the campaigns of indifferent (or proximal to that latter) choice
of voters.
2 Elections under indifferent choice of voters
Further, we shall consider the electoral processes (and its peculiarities, in turn)
of the Russian Federation. Russia has bicameral parliament, with State Duma
as the lower house, and the Council of Federation as the upper chamber with
the lower house members elected through the mixed electoral system. That
latter implies that a half of the seats at the State Duma (225 seats of total
450) are to be filled through the party list system, while the other half is filled
through the elections at the 225 single constituencies. Here we shall consider
both options.
Let’s start from the simplest hypothetical situation. Suppose two candidates
race in a single constituency, say, to occupy a position, which must be occupied
through the elections process (like the President of the Russian Federation,
or a governor). Suppose, then, that these two candidates are indistinguishable
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persons from the voters point of view. Of course, such hypothetical situation
never occurs in real political campaign: every candidate always tends to figure
out his/her differences from the rival candidates. Anyway, let us suggest at
the first step that two candidates do not differ, in the minds of voters, and all
the revisions and sharpening of our theory would be done later, starting from
that original point.
The essential question is what pattern of votes distribution one should expect
in such situation of a shortage of definiteness? Probability theory makes one
expect 50 % to 50 % breakdown of votes. Human nature, nevertheless, fails
to simulate really random behaviour; this failure yields in a distortion of the
ratio of votes, according to the golden section law:
0.618034 . . . ÷ 0.381966 . . . . (1)
Probably this fact was originally found by Vladimir Lefebre (see (Lefebvre, Smolyan,
1975; Lefebvre, 1980, 1987a,b, 1995; Adams-Webber, 1996)). Here one may ex-
pect to meet the same behavioral pattern, when any differences between two
candidates seem to be negligible 1 .
Actually, three candidates take part in a racing, not two. The third candidate
is not a physical person, rather it is an “Against all candidates” option in a
ballot. A relation (1) must be replaced, then, with
0.50000 . . . ÷ 0.30902 . . . ÷ 0.19098 . . . . (2)
Here one might assume that the least value of (2) corresponds to the option
“Against all candidates”. This assumption sounds natural, since a leading
choice of that option means a comparatively greater definiteness in an electoral
preference of voters, that it is supposed by the original hypothesis. And, more
generally, if N candidates (or parties) take part in the race, then the portions
of ballots gathered by the racing participants should be ranked proportionally
to Fibonacci numbers (Vorobyev, 1976). These are defined with the recursion
relation
φi+2 = φi+1 + φi , (3)
with φ1 = φ2 = 1. A motivation behind this approach is a premise that a
person makes an indifferent choice in any neighboring couple of candidates. A
background theory for the distorted choice in a case of two options is described
in detail by V.Lefebvre.
1 We do not discuss the way how one may head in such competition.
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3 Some cases of elections at Russia
Let now consider some specific cases of the elections run in Russia. Both
personal and party list elections would be considered.
3.1 Elections of the governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai, September 2002
The election of governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai took place in September 2002.
Two rounds have been carried out; Alexander Khloponin (future winner) and
Alexander Uhss advanced to the second round. 46,82% of all registered voters
had taken part in the elections. A winner (Alexander Khloponin) gathered
48,07% of votes, and Alexander Uhss gathered 41,83% of all votes; 9,15% of
all voters voted against both candidates.
There was a high level of electoral (and political) tension during these elec-
tions. It was evident from outer features, such as an abundant drive, both
outdoor, and via electronic mass-media one, and from numerous scandals; the
hottest one was with the approval of the election results by the regional Elec-
tion Commission. Also, a number of staff involved in the campaign and various
events was very high, from both sides, for such type of racing.
3.2 Election of Mayor of the city of Krasnoyarsk
The Mayor elections took place in December of 1999. Three candidates had
taken part at these elections, including the empowered major. There were one-
round elections; i.e. the winner (same person had been elected for the major
position) gathered 87,91 % of the votes, the option “Against all candidates”
had been chosen by 7,85 % of the voters who entered the polling stations.
Candidate came in the second position gathered 3,42% of the ballots. It should
be stressed, that the option “Against all candidates”, not the real candidate,
captured second rank.
These elections were characterized by the lowest possible electoral tension.
On the contrary, the elections to the city Council exhibited a high level of
the electoral tension (simultaneously, the members of the city Council had
been elected). The major’s block (that was an entity to be elected via party
list system) had gathered less than 25%. Three issues played the key role in
the victory of Mr Pimashkov (who won the major position): first, he was the
major already in the office before the racing; second, he provided oppositon to
governor Lebed (who met with the minimal support of the residents of the city
4
of Krasnoyarsk); and, third, all other contenders were beyond any criticism,
frankly speaking.
3.3 Election of Mayor of the city of Norilsk
The elections of the major of the city of Norilsk took place in October 2003.
Several candidates have taken part in the elections, which were carried out
in a single round, with 34,2 % of all registered voters coming to the polls.
The winner (Mr Melnikov) gathered 51,34% of the ballots, and the secondly
ranked contender gathered 33,21% of all the ballots; 15,45% of all voters had
chosen “Against all candidates” option.
These results seem to be the closest to the theoretical situation of a low def-
initeness of voters. Indeed, a high political tension did not transform into an
electoral one. The point is that the result of the elections was the matter of
interest of two powerful financial groups, while the interests of voters felt off
a discussion of any political forces taking part in the elections. Such situation
appears to be rather close to an indifferent choice, while the preference of vot-
ers was the matter of habit. The winner connected well with his constituents.
3.4 Preliminary survey of the cases
It is evident, that the ranking observed in the races is far from the theoretically
expected. This fact is obvious: any real campaignmust differ from a situation
of an indifferent choice. Probably, the situation of the election of the major of
the city of Norilsk (see 3.3) looks the closest one to a “reference” distribution.
The data show that the preferences of voters were rather clear and founded. It
is a well known fact, that a significant part of voters taking part in elections
makes their decision upon entering a polling station. It does not mean that
they choose indifferently; however, the key difference in Western and up-to-
date Russian electoral experience is the difference of the background for a
choice development. While western voters tend to base their choice on a history
of voting, the Russian voters pay very much attention to attitude, mood and
feelings.
On the contrary, the case of election of the major of the city of Norilsk shows
that the situation of a low definiteness (or rather proximate to that one)
may occur, when public leaders or politicians do not express their programme
clearly. Such conspiracy fails to present the public interests in the programs
of the candidates (see Section 3.3). The main political players prominent in
Norilsk, did not express their position towards the presumptive victory of
Mr Melnikov (currently, the mayor of the city). In particular, top managers
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of “Norilsk Nickel” failed to say explicitly that they would not cooperate
with Mr Melnikov, in case of his election. This conspiracy yielded a wide
spread confidence of the voters that the policy of the corporation (and their
well-being, which totally depends of the corporation policy) would remain
the same. In consequence, the choice was irrational and was determined by
emotional and psychological reasons. Mr Melnikov was emotionally closer to
the residents of the city.
4 Party list system elections
Practically, one can never meet the ideal situation of indifferent choice. Even
experimental conditions could hardly provide such situation. Following factors
severely damage the original assumption about the complete ignorance of vot-
ers and indifferentness in their choice. A specificity of human mind procedures
of multivariant classification is the first factor. This specificity may manifest in
the occurrence of stable and long-term preferences towards the entities within
the list, but not for any couple of them. Say, a voter always prefers “Union of
Right Forces” for “Yabloko”, but fails to place this (strictly ordered) couple
within a line of other parties and entities. An impact of the external con-
ditions (advertising, political sketches, etc.) is the second factor. This factor
may manifest itself through the specific electoral technologies, ranging from
activity of an entity’s double (or a person’s double) to the dissemination by
a candidate of the negative information concerning himself, or herself. Such
information may be not appreciated by the voters thus yielding a growth in
the candidate’s rating.
Let’s now consider some results of the elections carried out on a party list
system. The results are shown in charts, where the left axis represent a real
rating of an entity, and the right one shows the deviation index between
real and theoretically expected (3) rating observed for a completely indifferent
choice. The excess of the index over 1 means that the entity gathered more
ballots, than may be expected for a completely indifferent choice 2 .
4.1 Elections of Legislative Assembly of Krasnoyarsk Krai, 2001
Figure 1 shows the results of elections of the Legislative Assembly of Kras-
noyarsk Krai, which took place in 2001. The pattern in this figure is rather
far from the one expected for the situation of completely indifferent choice. It
2 It should be stressed, we do not discuss the issue of a leadership in such line of
entities.
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Fig. 1. Legislative Assembly of Krasnoyarsk krai elections in 2001. Left axis rep-
resents the rating of political entities, the right one shows the deviation between
real rating and theoretical distribution. Greater label shows “Against all entities”
option.
looks very natural, since the elections were running in the highly polarized po-
litical situation, where two coalitions competed relentlessly for the seats in the
Assembly. The extended markers point out the portion of “Against all enti-
ties” option. Following are the entities, as they are enumerated in the figure: 1
stands of “Ours!” coalition; 2 stands for coalition for Anatoly Bykov; 3 stands
for “For Lebed!” coalition; 4 stands for the Communist party of the Russian
Federation; 5 stands for “Medved” coalition; 6 stands for the Northern party;
7 stands for “Against all entities”; 8 stands for “Hope and buttress” coali-
tion; 9 stands for Zubov’s coalition; 10 stands for “Communists and patriots of
Krasnoyarsk motherland for the soviet power” coalition; 11 stands for Union
of Right Forces; 12 stands for Liberal Democratic Party; and 13 stands for
“Yabloko”.
Theoretically, if one cumulates the ballots gathered by two opposing coalitions
(that are “Ours!” coalition Bykov’s coalition) into a single pool, then the
deviation index (0, 94) becomes very close to 1. This fact shows that any
splitting of political players under the strong electoral tension would yield
a decrease of the ballot portion which might be gathered by a leader under
the indifferent choice. Surprisingly, these elections show a non-monotonous
behaviour of the deviation index.
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4.2 State Duma elections
There were three elections to the State Duma since 1993. State Duma has
been reinstated in 1993, just after the dismissal of the Supreme Council of the
Russian Federation. Here we analyze the results of the elections of 1999 and
2003. Below are two lists of parties and associations, which had taken part at
these elections; the entities are enumerated according to the ballot-paper.
There were 26 entities taking part in the elections of 1999: Conservative move-
ment of Russia is number 1; Russian nationwide union is number 2; “Women of
Russia” movement is number 3; Stalin block for USSR is number 4; “Yabloko”
party is number 5; “Communists and work people for the Soviet Union” move-
ment is number 6; “Peace. Labor. May.” movement is number 7; Block of Niko-
laev and Fyodorov is number 8; “Intellectual heritage” national movement is
number 9; Congress of Russian communes is number 10; Peace and Unity
party is number 11; Russian party of women defense is number 12; Medved
(later “United Russia” party) is number 13; “Social democrats” movement is
number 14; Nationwide movement for the army support is number 15; Zhiri-
novsky block (later Liberal Democrats party) is number 16; “For civic dignity”
movement is number 17; “Motherland – All Russia” is number 18; Communist
party of Russian Federation is number 19; “Russian line” movement is number
20; All-Russian political party of peoples is number 21; Union of Right Forces
is number 22; “Russia – our Motherland” is number 23; Socialistic party of
Russia is number 24; Party of pensioners is number 25; Russian socialistic
party is number 26; and Against all entities option is number 27.
Twenty three entities took part in the elections of 2003: “Unity” movement is
number 1; Union of Right Forces is number 2; Party of pensioners is number
3; “Yabloko” party is number 4; “For saint Russia” is number 5; Joint party
“Russia” is number 6; “New line — Russia on Car” is number 7; Republican
party is number 8; “Greenpeace” is number 9; Party of farmers is number
10; Real patriots of Russia is number 11; All-Russian political party of peo-
ples is number 12; Party of constitutional democrats is number 13; “Great
Russia – Euroasian Union” block is number 14; “SLON” party is number 15;
“Fartherland” block is number 16; Peace and Unity party is number 17; Lib-
eral Democrats party (former Zhirinovsky block) is number 18: Russian party
of life is number 19; “United Russia” party (former Medved) is number 20;
Democratic party of Russia is number 21; Party of business development is
number 22; Communist party of Russian Federation is number 23, and finally,
number 24 stands for Against all entities” option.
Both lists of parties look rather long and very pretentious. Twenty six and
twenty three entities took part in the elections of 1999 and 2003, respectively.
Only nine parties and associations had taken part in both elections, with
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respect to the transformations and integrations of smaller entities. This patters
is an evidence of high instability of political entities in Russia. Probably two
or three more entities from the list of the elections of 2003 could be derived
from some entities from the list of the elections of 1999, while formally they
seem to be independent.
4.2.1 Elections of 1999
Six parties had overcome the legislatively established threshold of 5% ballots,
to be represented in the State Duma. The pattern of ballot distribution differs
significantly from the one observed for the Legislative Assembly of Krasno-
yarsk Krai elections (see above section 4.1). Figure 2 shows the results of the
State Duma elections in 1999. A number in the horizontal axis in Figure 2
Fig. 2. State Duma elections of 1999. Left axis shows the party’s rating, but the
right one represents the deviation index between real and theoretical rating. The
parties and entities are ranked according to the ballot; see details in the text.
corresponds to the entities as they listed in a ballot and ranked in descending
order with respect to the votes gathered by a party.
4.2.2 Elections of 2003
Figure 3 shows the results of the elections of 2003. The parties (or associa-
tions) in this figure are ranked in descending order according to their rating.
Again, the enlarged label on the chart indicates the “Against all entities” op-
tion. This picture reveals a significant difference of the elections from those
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Fig. 3. State Duma elections of 2003. Left axis shows the party’s rating, but the
right one represents the deviation index between real and theoretical rating. The
parties and entities are ranked according to the ballot; see details in the text.
of 1999. Firstly, those former show much more concordant pattern of the ob-
served ballot distribution, than the theoretical one (see (3)). It means that
these elections were running in a situation of significantly less definiteness,
in comparison to the previous ones. Secondly, the deviation index exhibits
a three-fold decay. Thirdly, a two-fold growth of the ballots given Against
all entities is manifested. We believe that this manifestation corroborates the
increased trend to vote “by guess-work”. These data show that all the mi-
nor entities that fail to pass 5 % threshold nevertheless managed to pick up
much greater number of ballots, in comparison to the situation of completely
indifferent choice.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Basic purpose of this paper is to develop a tool to classify electoral cam-
paigns from the point of view of the rationality vs. irrationality of the voter’s
choice. The key issue is the question of a definition of “equilibrium” or “in-
different” voting. That latter is the voting where a voter fails to figure out
his (or her) rational arguments for choosing a specific candidate of a specific
party from the list. We believe that the outcome of the elections under such
circumstances should follow the proportion described by Fibonacci numbers
(Vorobyev, 1976).
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One should distinguish such “by guess-work” voting from the really ran-
dom one. That latter should be interpreted according to the probabilities the-
ory. A voter fails to avoid a reflexive pattern in the behavior, so an indifferent
choice would exhibit a bias in ballot distribution, among two options. The bias
is defined by the golden section law. Such bias in preferences is peculiar for a
human being, and constitutes a core feature of human psychology (Lefebvre,
1987b, 1995; Adams-Webber, 1996).
Any real electoral campaign would obviously differ from the indifferent choice
situation. This fact is evident due to the behaviour of the deviation index
which compares real rating and theoretically expected one (3). Roughly, one
can compare any electoral campaign to the reference situation of the indifferent
choice. There are two poles around this “zero point” pattern. The former is
the situation of high mobilization of voters (voters become the supporters),
and the latter is the situation of increased political (or electoral) tension. The
mobilization is manifested through the strong leadership of a candidate, in
comparison to the leadership with indifferent choice of voters. High electoral
tension manifests through the closer ballots gathered by two competitors.
Such proximity of ballots means an occurrence of practically equal pools of
supporters of each contestant. Another reason of a discrepancy between golden
section theory and real vote distribution is a diversity of people. We believe,
the people differ among themselves, from the point of view of their attitude
to political issues; it may result in permanent occurrence of a “tail” in the
deviation index.
No one real electoral campaign could be considered as the indifferent choice
situation. This latter is just a theoretical issue which introduces a reference
point for the analysis of efficiency and public processes underlying the cam-
paign. Evidently, the societies with developed democracies never meet the
situation close to the indifferent choice. Probably, such pattern of public atti-
tude to politicians and parties could be observed in transitional societies with
lack of experience in democratic institutions. Nevertheless, both practition-
ers and researchers of that type of societies may capitalize on the campaign
typifying developed above.
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